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WHAT is charity? The question was asked at this symposium to
provoke thought about what is central to the nature or activity
of organizations in the private, nonprofit sector that justifies spe-
cial treatment under law and public policy. The symposium
brought together a collection of people eminently qualified to ex-
plore this question and the ramifications of various answers that
have been or might be proposed. Our aim was to bring together
legal scholars, economists, and historians; academics and practi-
tioners, with the idea that what each had to say, shaped by his or
her particular expertise and perspective, would feed and be fed by
the perspectives of the others. It is our hope that the collection of
papers and commentary presented here will continue to enrich the
ongoing discussion.
Where have we looked for the answer to the question that is
the theme for this symposium? Where should we look? Should we
look to what organizations which purport to be "charitable" do?
Should we attempt to define a sphere of activity that is uniquely
and quintessentially "charitable"? Of course, this approach begs
the question. We can look to what content the law has tradition-
ally given to the term charitable. What we find, however, is not
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especially helpful, for the law has generally spoken in terms that
are themselves difficult to pin down - defining charity to "include
whatever will promote, in a legitimate way, the comfort, happi-
ness, and improvement of an indefinite number of persons."'
Perhaps, then, we should look to the deeper historical roots of
charity, in the hope that we may find there an organizing principle
or principles by which we can determine whether any particular
activity or organization can be properly and consistently consid-
ered to be "charitable." There is, of course, a substantial litera-
ture on the concept of charity, derived from philosophy, theology,
and historical experience. A broad distinction emerges, for in-
stance, between the Judeo-Christian notion of charity, or
"tzedaka," and the Greek idea of philanthropy. The Judeo-Chris-
tian notion is grounded in interpersonal activity through which
one individual helps a less fortunate one, or more broadly, a com-
munity rallies to the aid of those of its members in need. Impor-
tant contributors to moral philosophy, Maimonides prominently
among them, have developed this line of thought into a theory of
self-help in which there is a ladder of virtues, with the highest
form of charity considered to be that which assists individuals in
achieving independence and self-respect.' This notion of
"tzedaka" is one principle that might guide the construction of
law and public policy in differentiating between those activities
and organizations that are worthy of special tax benefits and those
that are not, and in determining which activities and organizations
warrant special regulatory treatment.
The Greek idea of philanthropy is broader and less personal
than that of "tzedaka," although it too is closely related to the
notion of community. Philanthropy, in the Greek sense, focuses on
1. Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 520, 82 N.W. 345, 357 (1900). The English
Statute of Charitable Uses, St. 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601), provides an early catalogue of activi-
ties and institutions considered "charitable," although its list has never been considered all-
inclusive. The statute's preamble enumerated the following list of recognized "charitable"
purposes:
Relief of aged, impotent, and poor people, maintenance of sick and maimed
soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universi-
ties, repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, seabanks and high-
ways, education, and preferment of orphans, relief, stock or maintenance of
houses of correction, marriages of poor maids, supportation, aid and help of
young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed, relief or redemption of
prisoners and captives, aid of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of
fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes.
2. O'Connell, Our Religious Heritage, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT 1-4 (B.
O'Connell ed. 1983)(citing J. MINKIN, THE WORLD OF MOSES MAIMONIDES 45-49 (1957)).
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broad-scale contributions to the public infrastructure and to a so-
ciety's institutions of education, culture, and other aspects of its
general well-being and quality of life. The benefits of philanthropy
fall broadly and without reference to specific recipients of aid.'
The Greek idea of philanthropy is another concept that might
serve as a guide for tax and regulatory treatment of institutions
and activities in the nonprofit sector.
But examination of history has not yet given us a satisfying
answer to the question, "what is charity?" We will not find a con-
sistent notion of charity underlying the development of the legal
framework of charity in this country that will be useful for steer-
ing its further evolution, because there have been too many inter-
twined, and even inconsistent, forces shaping policy, law, and even
the scholarly attempts to explain them.
Can we find our organizing principle in more recent history
- in the official pronouncements of the Congress, the state legis-
latures, the courts, and the Internal Revenue Service? Looking
there, we find no systematic set of rules and policies thoughtfully
derived from a careful rationale. Instead, we see a pattern of ben-
efits and regulations that resembles a crazy quilt. Perhaps that is
to be expected. A look at the private, nonprofit sector reveals that
the sector is far from homogeneous. While what we call the chari-
table organizations within the sector' account for over 90 % of the
employment and income generated by the sector, they constitute
under 60 % of the total number of tax-exempt organizations.5 The
other 40 % are, in some very important ways, quite different from
the charitable organizations. Many are what have come to be la-
beled "mutual benefit" organizations, which direct their activities
and energies to the production of benefits for their own members.
Perhaps because the sector is so diverse, our question tends to
arise in very fact-specific contexts, where its answer will determine
if an organization or activity belongs outside the nonprofit sphere
or, within the sphere, outside the circle of tax-preferred charitable
status. As a consequence, the focus of the inquiry and the re-
sponses to it have tended to be driven by the perception of the
3. Weaver, Pre-Christian Philanthropy, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT 5, 8-9 (B.
O'Connell ed. 1983).
4. These would be the organizations which qualify for exemption under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
5. V. HODGKINSON & M. WEITZMAN, DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR: A
STATISTICAL PROFILE, Tables 1-3 (Interim Update Fall 1988).
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immediate problem, without reference to the larger context. In
short, the legal and policy framework has not been built on a care-
ful consideration of the question "what is charity?" Rather, it is
made of a collection of responses to the question: "this can't be
charity, can it?"
Suzanne Ross McDowell's paper in this volume addresses
precisely this sort of situation. In it, she sets out to provide a care-
ful and reasoned examination of a particular tax provision - the
treatment of income from debt-financed investments of tax-ex-
empt entities. The uncertainty and unfairness of the present rule
appears to result, at least in part, from the fact that the formula-
tion of the provision has been driven by some vague notion that
this non-traditional mode of operation and support is somehow not
what "charity" does - that it constitutes, at bottom, unprincipled
trading on an organization's identification as charitable. Instead,
McDowell suggests, we can and should construct the rule on a
foundation of principled analysis. Similarly, Richard Steinberg's
paper takes on the question of whether "excessive" fundraising
costs somehow negate the charitable nature of the fundraising or-
ganization. Steinberg suggests that our intuitions with respect to
this question may not withstand careful analysis. He proposes,
then, that any attempts to regulate fundraising behavior ought to
be informed by a better understanding of the real relationship be-
tween fundraising costs and practices and an organization's
charitability. Otherwise, by blindly following our intuitions, we
run the risk of hampering exactly that charitable activity we want
to promote.
The search for a coherent rationale by which at least the fu-
ture directions of law and policy could be shaped has led some
scholars to offer both positive and normative explanations of the
charitable sector. The concepts of tzedaka and philanthropy both
hinge on private, voluntaristic activity undertaken in areas where
governmental action is a clear alternative. Government can and
does provide relief and welfare services and supplies much of the
infrastructure that undergirds and enhances the quality of life for
the citizenry as a whole. In pure form, these are activities from
which business cannot profit.6 As a consequence, we would not
6. Speaking generally, the effects of high transaction costs and free-rider behavior
will cause the normal operation of the private, for-profit market to undersupply "public" or




expect them to be supplied in the marketplace, and governmental
or voluntary nonprofit initiative is required if they are to be sup-
plied at all. A leading scholar of economic theory of the nonprofit
sector has proposed a model to explain when and why we might
expect government to be ineffective as a corrector of private mar-
ket failures and distributional inequities.7 Information about some
kinds of interests is likely to be more available to policymakers
than information about other sorts of interests because of differ-
ences among interest groups in their ability to organize and trans-
mit their preferences to policymakers. Furthermore, the incentives
to which policymakers respond, such as reelection in the case of
legislators, or rewards for success in achieving misdefined goals in
the case of administrative officials, are likely to lead policymakers
to pay more attention to some expressed preferences than to
others. Where the information available to governmental deci-
sionmakers or the incentives faced by decisionmakers are skewed,
government will not likely be "able to take the steps required by
the pursuit of the public interest in efficiency and equity."8 In
some subset of these situations, the nonprofit, charitable sector
will be the more effective vehicle for correcting market failure.
Perhaps the answer to our question - what is charity? - is to be
found in the accurate characterization of the sphere of activities
where the nonprofit form both corrects for private, for-profit mar-
ket failure and is free of the particular shortcomings which keep
government, in some cases, from serving as an adequate corrector
of that private market failure.
A third concept which emerges as a theme in discussions of
law and policy toward the nonprofit sector is "trust." In brief,
there is a broad class of goods and services that can be profitably
provided by the business sector, but for which there is doubt that
for-profit enterprises would provide, as the British say, a "fair
value for money." These goods and services are ones for which the
consumer is at a severe informational disadvantage, relative to the
supplier, and therefore has difficulty judging the quality of the
product received. In sensitive and critical areas, such as health
care or care for children or the elderly, the consequences of this
informational disadvantage may be dire. Hansmann 9 and others'°
7. B. WEISBROD, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANAL-
Ysis 30-41 (1978).
8. Id. at 31.
9. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
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argue that while profit-making businesses have direct financial in-
centives to exploit informational advantages over the consumer,
nonprofit institutions, because they cannot distribute profits to
owners or managers, have no such incentive. Partly because of this
lack of incentive to exploit informational advantages, nonprofits
are seen to be more "trustworthy" and therefore deserving of spe-
cial consideration under law and public policy, at least where al-
ternative institutional mechanisms such as professional licensure,
direct regulation of business, or direct governmental supply are
less effective.
In the United States, all three traditions and concepts -
tzedaka, philanthropy, and fiduciary responsibility - are strongly
ingrained and intermixed. Is this triad of ideas - charity, philan-
thropy, and trust - sufficiently powerful to allow a defensible and
operational rationale for public tax preference and regulation to
be built upon them? Judging by the debates captured within the
papers in this volume, the question remains open.
What is charity? Often, the answer is tied to some overarch-
ing notion of public benefit or public good. That much is easy -
pursuit of public benefit is integral to our oldest and most basic
ideas of charity. What is more difficult is that very specific, and
not necessarily consistent, ideas about what constitutes the public
interest often drive our decisions about how to treat organizations
which purport to pursue it. Those ideas are often built on agree-
ment or disagreement with a particular vision of the public good
or on generalized notions about the inherently charitable or non-
charitable nature of the means used to pursue that vision.
Our regulation of political advocacy by tax-exempt, charita-
ble organizations provides a good example. The law restricts advo-
cacy by certain kinds of nonprofit organizations and limits the tax
benefits available to those which engage in advocacy work, espe-
cially lobbying. Legislative, administrative, and judicial formula-
tions of various aspects of these limits have tended to reflect im-
plicit and often inconsistent conclusions about the charitability of
particular viewpoints, or about the noncharitability of particular
means of achieving admittedly charitable ends. The unsatisfying
state of the law in this area reflects, perhaps, not so much a ten-
10. See, e.g., ElIman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV.
999 (1982); Nelson & Krashinsky, Two Major Issues of Public Policy: Public Policy and
Organization of Supply, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR DAY CARE OF YOUNG CHILDREN 47 (R.
Nelson & D. Young eds. 1973).
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dency to arrive at wrong answers as the impossibility of arriving
at an acceptable and consistent solution to a question that has not
been properly formulated. Is advocacy in the public interest? Is it
consistent with notions of charity, philanthropy, and trust? Does
the answer depend on what is being advocated? Is advocacy of
antivivisection in the public interest? Gay rights? Pro-life? Pro-
choice? Welfare reform? There is no way to arrive at a consensus
as to whether successful advocacy in these areas would benefit the
public. One possible response is to ban advocacy activity alto-
gether, which we have come near to doing, since we cannot tell
"good" advocacy from "bad" advocacy. But perhaps in this con-
text we need yet another concept of charity. In this context, it
would make sense to focus on breadth of support - to define
charity as any vision, within the broad outlines of tzedeka and
philanthropy, which attracts enough voluntary support to give us
some assurance that the organization's viewpoint is not simply a
reflection of narrow, private interests."1 This approach is consis-
tent with Weisbrod's observation that the form in which a non-
profit organization receives its revenue is a useful proxy measure
of the "degree of collectiveness" of the organization's activities,
with a high proportion of contributions, gifts, and grants, as com-
pared to dues and sales, indicating that the organization is proba-
bly providing collective goods of the sort that the private market-
place can be expected to undersupply.12 Certainly, Charles
Clotfelter's observations about the distorting effects of our tax
treatment of charitable contributions and Richard Steinberg's
analysis of the effects of donor information and fundraising costs
take on a critical importance if we decide that an ability to attract
broad, voluntary public support is the organizing principle behind
the concept of charity, at least for some purposes.
"For some purposes" - perhaps that is the key. Ultimately,
it is fruitless to approach the question, "what is charity?" without
first addressing the question, "why do you ask?" That question is
implicit in the second half of the symposium title, "Implications
for Law and Policy." As we consider ways to improve upon the
patchwork, ad hoc legal framework that currently defines and reg-
11. For a more complete discussion of this idea, see Chisolm, Exempt Organization
Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201 (1987).
12. Weisbrod, Private Goods, Collective Goods: The Role of the Nonprofit Sector,
in THE EcONOMICS OF NONPROPRIETARY ORGANIZATIONS 139 (K. Clarkson & D. Martin
eds. 1980).
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ulates charity, we would do well to identify carefully just what we
are trying to accomplish with our regulations and determine, as
best we can, whether a particular choice will likely move us to-
ward or away from our larger policy goals.
We must ask, "what is charity?" because the concept of
charity is useful in defining the boundaries between the private,
nonprofit sector and the rest of the economy - that is, from busi-
ness and government - and also for making distinctions within
the nonprofit sector itself. The boundaries must be drawn and the
distinctions made, if we are to tailor our tax and regulatory treat-
ment to best accomplish our social goals. And, as Michael Hone
suggests in his paper, only if we ask what our purpose is in seek-
ing to characterize an organization or an activity this time can we
hope to arrive at an answer with any functional value at all. The
question - "what is charity?" - may call for a very different
answer when it is asked for purposes of devising a justifiable
scheme for regulating charitable fundraising solicitation than
when the same question is asked in the context of working out the
dimensions and details of charitable tax exemption. And as Henry
Hansmann points out, we ought to be sure to separate in our
minds two questions which are too often inappropriately tangled;
"what is charity?" is distinct from "what is nonprofit?" and it is
essential to bring the right inquiry to bear on any given policy
formulation. Michael Hone explains why the proposed Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, to which he was a major con-
tributor, provides separate organizational categories for charitable
and noncharitable nonprofit organizations. Henry Hansmann
takes another view, maintaining that it makes sense to distinguish
between charity and non-charity as we construct fiscal and regula-
tory law, but that organizational law need not ask or resolve that
issue. He argues that organizational law is better constructed on
the broader definitional base of "nonprofit."
There has been, to date, precious little systematic analysis to
guide the formulation of law and policy. Evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of existing provisions must rely, at best, on comparisons of
arrangements that have occurred serendipitously, without overall
design. And, as Charles Clotfelter ably demonstrates in his paper
in this collection, the policy instruments by which we have sought
to promote the objectives of charity in its various manifestations
do not have clean, singular impacts, but rather a variety of some-
times conflicting effects which may work at cross purposes.
The papers that compose this volume delve deeply into the
[Vol. 39:653
1988-89] INTRODUCTION
intricacies of the present policies and alternative proposals sur-
rounding tax exemption and regulation of nonprofit organizations.
As the authors explore various corners of the complicated legal
framework that presently defines and regulates charity, underlying
and informing their inquiries and conclusions are explicit and im-
plicit responses to the question, "what is charity?" The papers and
the discussions that follow from them fail to reach consensus on
the meaning of charity or on the definitive merit of particular poli-
cies or proposals. They reflect the difficulty of using traditional
concepts of charity, philanthropy, and trust to unequivocally clas-
sify organizations and activities into those worthy or not worthy of
tax preference, appropriate or not appropriate for special regula-
tory treatment. Rather, they suggest that some new ways of think-
ing about these old and venerable subjects may be appropriate.
The law of nonprofits is yet a young discipline. We hope that
these essays open some doors to new and renewed attention by the
best of thinkers in the future.

